seekrit — secrets for agents

Create a seekrit workspace and your own machine credential — one call, no human, no browser. Binds the credential to this session, so every other tool works on your next call with no config change and…

Read the recommended first-project recipe end to end: which steps run here and which need the local crypto plane. Takes no arguments and returns a prose walkthrough. Call this before provisioning anyt…

Get the exact commands for running the local crypto plane (the `@seekrit/mcp` npm server, the `@seekrit/cli` CLI, seekrit-run, seekrit-proxy), including a copy-paste .mcp.json that reuses this session…

Look up how to perform one crypto-plane operation locally — the targeted answer for "the tool I expected is not on this server". Returns { operation, where, how } for a known operation, or a note expl…

Show the authenticated machine client and the org it can access. Call this first: it confirms the credential works and tells you which org slug to pass (or that you can omit `org` entirely). Returns {…

List the organizations this credential can access. Use it to find the `org` slug every other tool takes; prefer whoami if you also want to confirm which client you are. Returns [{ id, name, slug, role…

List the applications in an organization — an application is the top-level container that owns environments, which in turn own secrets. Start here when you know the org but not the app slug the other …

List the environments an application owns (production, staging, …). Names and slugs only — never values. Use this to find the `env` slug that list_secrets and the delete/restore tools take. Returns [{…

List ephemeral branch configs (per-PR / preview environments) across an application, or just those forked from one environment. Names, parents, and expiry only — never values. Use it before delete_bra…

List the shared groups in an organization — a group is a reusable bag of secrets (a shared datastore, a vendor account) that many application environments can compose in rather than duplicating. Use i…

List the environments belonging to one shared GROUP — a group holds a separate value set per slug, so its `production` differs from its `staging`. Use this when you already have a group and want its o…

List the shared groups composed INTO one application environment, in precedence order (higher position wins a name clash). Read this to explain where a secret name actually comes from, or to pick the …

List organization members with their public keys. The public keys are what you pass to `grant_env` on the LOCAL crypto plane to give a human the ability to decrypt — so call this when handing a projec…

List the secret NAMES and versions in an environment. NEVER returns values: this server cannot decrypt. Use it to discover which names exist before referencing them; to read a value, run the local cry…

List one secret's version history: who wrote each version, when, and which ones were restores. Metadata only — never values. Pair with restore_secret to undo a bad write: read the history here, then p…

List an organization's service tokens — the long-lived credentials that let a deployed workload fetch secrets. Metadata only: the token strings are shown once at creation (on the local crypto plane) a…

List invitations to the organization that have been sent but not yet accepted. Use it to confirm an invite_member call landed, or to find an `inviteId` for revoke_invite. Accepted invitations become m…

List the managed KMS keys the caller can see — symmetric and signing keys seekrit stores wrapped, for encrypting data outside the secret store. Metadata only: key material is fetched and used on the l…

List the registered temporary-access targets — the databases (Postgres, MySQL, …) against which short-lived credentials can be minted on demand instead of storing a standing password. Use it to see wh…

List temporary-access leases that have been issued — the ledger of who got a short-lived credential against which target and until when. Never includes the credential itself. Use it to find a `leaseId…

Read the organization's append-only audit trail, most recent first — every mutation across apps, environments, secrets, members, and tokens. Use it to answer "what changed and who did it"; for one sec…

Show the org's plan, effective entitlements, current usage, and which upgrade actions are available. Read this if a create action was refused with a plan limit — it names the limit you hit and how to …

Create an application — the container that will own environments and secrets. This step needs no key material, so it runs here. Creating its environments does NOT: create_env mints a data key and live…

Create a shared group — a reusable bag of secrets (a shared datastore, a vendor account) that many application environments compose in rather than each keeping a copy. Use create_app instead for a dep…

Compose a shared group into an application environment, so that environment resolves the group's secrets as well as its own. Safe to repeat — composing an already-composed group just updates its posit…

Remove a composed group from an application environment. The group and its secrets are untouched — only the link is dropped — but the environment stops resolving every name it inherited from that grou…

Invite a human to the organization by email (admin only). They join at the given role once they sign in. Use this to hand a project off to a person — then grant them decryption with `grant_env` on the…

Change an application's display name. The slug is immutable — every other tool refers to the app by slug, so a rename breaks nothing. Use delete_app + create_app only if the slug itself must change. R…

Change a shared group's display name. The slug is immutable — references from composed environments are by slug, so a rename breaks nothing. Returns the updated { id, orgId, name, slug, createdAt }.

Roll a secret back to an earlier version — the undo for a bad write. The stored ciphertext is replayed as a NEW version, so history is append-only and nothing is overwritten. Read list_secret_versions…

Delete a secret from an environment, discarding its ciphertext and every version. Irreversible — restore_secret CANNOT bring it back (that only rolls back within a surviving secret's history), and re-…

Revoke a service token by id. Future key fetches by that token stop immediately, so any workload still using it loses access on its next read. If the holder may have cached the key already, also rotat…

Cancel a pending organization invitation before it is accepted. Use this for an invite sent in error; once someone has accepted, they are a member and this no longer applies. Find the id with list_inv…

Revoke a temporary-access lease now instead of waiting for it to expire — the leased database credential is dropped at the target immediately, so anything still holding it fails on its next connection…

Disable a managed KMS key: new encrypt/sign operations are blocked, while data already encrypted under it stays decryptable locally by existing grantees. Reversible only by an operator re-enabling the…

Revoke one principal's grant on a managed KMS key, across all its versions — that user or service token can no longer use the key, while everyone else keeps working. Use kms_disable_key instead to sto…

Delete an application together with all of its environments and their secrets, discarding the ciphertext. Irreversible — there is no undo and no export. This is the widest-blast-radius tool here; pref…

Delete a shared group together with its environments and their secrets, discarding the ciphertext. Irreversible. Every application environment that composed this group loses those names — check list_e…

Delete one application environment and the secrets it owns, discarding the ciphertext. Irreversible, and the environment's data key goes with it — recreating the environment means setting every value …

Tear down an ephemeral branch config and every value it overrode. The parent environment is untouched — only the branch's own overrides go — which makes this the routine cleanup when a PR merges. Irre…