Back to Spending Authority
Card snapshot
authority.webmesh.ai
·
2026-10-09 04:54:23 UTC
·
8f0ce4c4fa884d1e073af479c3d8aa9bbf2c2354188789da017cf2b20cc46918
This is a frozen copy of the agent's agent-card.json as we observed it at the timestamp above. We capture a new snapshot every time the card's content hash changes. Useful for: forensic drift analysis, verifying downstream callers see the right version, reproducing routing decisions made historically.
{
"capabilities": {
"extendedAgentCard": false,
"extensions": [
{
"description": "MCP server exposing request_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.",
"params": {
"discoveryUrl": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json",
"endpoint": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp",
"protocolVersion": "2025-03-26",
"transport": "streamable-http"
},
"required": false,
"uri": "https://modelcontextprotocol.io"
},
{
"description": "Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.",
"params": {
"agentFacts": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json",
"ard": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json",
"httpMessageSignaturesDirectory": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory",
"identityAnchors": [
"ans-x509",
"did:web",
"dns-aid",
"dnssec",
"dane-tlsa",
"dnsid"
],
"outboundSigning": "web-bot-auth",
"trustCard": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"
},
"required": false,
"uri": "https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"
},
{
"params": {
"ansRegistrationRequired": true,
"profile": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ucp",
"version": "2026-08-25"
},
"uri": "urn:webmesh:ucp:2026-08-25"
}
],
"pushNotifications": false,
"streaming": false
},
"defaultInputModes": [
"text/plain",
"application/json"
],
"defaultOutputModes": [
"application/json",
"text/plain"
],
"description": "The human's spending policy as a machine-verifiable instrument. Approves once and issues narrowly scoped RFC 9421 AP2 mandates with DPoP key binding (jkt). Stubbed Auth0 consent for the demo; mandate is the wire artifact the Supplier verifies and the Auditor checks.",
"documentationUrl": "https://agent.webmesh.ai",
"name": "Spending Authority",
"protocolVersion": "1.0",
"provider": {
"did": "did:web:authority.webmesh.ai",
"organization": "Webmesh",
"url": "https://webmesh.ai"
},
"securityRequirements": [
{
"noAuth": []
}
],
"securitySchemes": {
"ansIdentityCert": {
"description": "ANS Identity Certificate issued by the ANS Registration Authority. The agent presents this cert during the TLS handshake; clients verify against the chain advertised in the Trust Card's keys[].x5c. See https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json",
"type": "mutualTLS"
},
"httpMessageSignatures": {
"description": "RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures over response components, using the Ed25519 key advertised in the Trust Card. Public key directory at https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory",
"scheme": "signature",
"type": "http"
},
"noAuth": {
"description": "This agent is publicly accessible with no authentication required. All skills are available to any caller.",
"type": "noAuth"
},
"requesterSignature": {
"alg": "EdDSA",
"boundArgs": [
"subject_ans",
"quote_id",
"total",
"currency",
"merchant_ans",
"scope_hint",
"traveler_dpop_jwk"
],
"denialCodes": [
"REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED",
"BAD_SIGNATURE",
"STALE_REQUEST",
"REPLAYED_REQUEST",
"SUBJECT_MISMATCH",
"ARGS_MISMATCH",
"IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED",
"INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS"
],
"description": "Caller must include request_jws: a compact JWS (alg=EdDSA) signed with the caller's ANS identity Ed25519 key. Payload must bind: subject_ans, quote_id, total, currency, merchant_ans, scope_hint, traveler_dpop_jwk. Freshness: iat within 300 s of server time. Replay protection: jti stored per-request for 2x the freshness window; reuse is denied. JWKS discovery: authority resolves the caller's public key from {caller_host}/.well-known/jwks.json (internal loopback when GOVWARE_JWKS_INTERNAL_{SUBDOMAIN} is set). Denial codes: REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED, BAD_SIGNATURE, STALE_REQUEST, REPLAYED_REQUEST, SUBJECT_MISMATCH, ARGS_MISMATCH, IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED, INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS.",
"format": "compact-jws",
"freshnessSecs": 300,
"in": "toolArgument",
"jwksDiscovery": "caller-ans-jwks",
"name": "request_jws",
"replayProtection": "jti-dedup",
"type": "requesterJws"
}
},
"signatures": [
{
"header": {
"kid": "R7KbKGcHkBW3mZIwTO1DX3TSaTJTO0NXvZqMCb6LhE8"
},
"protected": "eyJhbGciOiJFUzI1NiIsImprdSI6Imh0dHBzOi8vYXV0aG9yaXR5LndlYm1lc2guYWkvLndlbGwta25vd24vYW5zL3RydXN0LWNhcmQuanNvbiIsImtpZCI6IlI3S2JLR2NIa0JXM21aSXdUTzFEWDNUU2FUSlRPME5YdlpxTUNiNkxoRTgiLCJ0eXAiOiJhZ2VudC1jYXJkK2p3cyJ9",
"signature": "8dBtqL9o2iG2kpdvdQBGbPBqTZlnUksYXszAN-69g2_xmv9nJ_2GYbveRrovGyFuMwuZe44OJiAr1E55iXLplw"
}
],
"skills": [
{
"description": "Issue a signed AP2 mandate with DPoP key binding (jkt). Requires a compact EdDSA JWS (request_jws) signed by the caller's ANS identity key, binding subject_ans, quote_id, total, currency, merchant_ans, scope_hint, and traveler_dpop_jwk. Freshness window: 300 s. Replay protection: jti must be unique. JWKS fetched from the caller's ANS JWKS endpoint.",
"examples": [
"Approve EUR 420 economy flight Madrid to Singapore",
"Approve up to EUR 500 for this flight booking",
"issue AP2 mandate for UCP purchase",
"AP2 spending authority UCP 2026-08-25"
],
"id": "request_mandate",
"inputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"name": "Issue Mandate",
"outputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"representativeQueries": [
"I need a spending mandate to authorize a flight booking",
"Approve a EUR 420 purchase at supplier.webmesh.ai for a Madrid to Singapore flight",
"Issue me an AP2 mandate for up to EUR 600 for this travel booking",
"Can you authorize payment for my flight from London to Singapore?"
],
"securityRequirements": [
{
"requesterSignature": {
"scope": "purchase:flight:*"
}
}
],
"tags": [
"mandate",
"authorization",
"dpop",
"requester-signature"
]
},
{
"description": "Return the current spending policy (max_per_trip, currency, allowed_merchants, categories).",
"examples": [
"What is the spending policy?",
"issue AP2 mandate for UCP purchase",
"AP2 spending authority UCP 2026-08-25"
],
"id": "get_policy",
"inputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"name": "Get Policy",
"outputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"representativeQueries": [
"How much can I spend per trip with this authority?",
"Which merchants are approved under this spending policy?",
"What currency and categories does this spending authority cover?"
],
"securityRequirements": [
{
"noAuth": []
}
],
"tags": [
"mandate",
"policy"
]
},
{
"description": "Issue a delegated AP2 spending mandate attenuated from a parent mandate. Callers must supply the parent payment mandate paired with the parent checkout mandate (both signed by this authority, unexpired) and a delegation JWS over the child parameters signed by the parent's cnf key. The child is capped by the remaining budget of its parent and of every ancestor up to the root (everything minted under one root mandate together stays within the root's amount), and keeps the parent's currency, merchant, offer and expiry. Delegating does not cancel the parent: it stays spendable, so a root of amount A risks at most A spent by the root plus A across its delegates. Returns checkout_mandate and payment_mandate as open AP2 chains, or a reason_code: DELEGATION_PROOF_REQUIRED, DELEGATION_PROOF_INVALID, DELEGATION_NONCE_REPLAYED, DELEGATION_BUDGET_EXHAUSTED, INVALID_AMOUNT, CURRENCY_MISMATCH, MERCHANT_NOT_ALLOWED, OFFER_NOT_ALLOWED, PARENT_EXPIRED, SCOPE_EXCEEDED_AT_HOP_2, REDELEGATION_EXCEEDS_GRANT or DELEGATION_LEDGER_UNAVAILABLE.",
"examples": [
"Delegate a $50 sub-mandate from my $100 mandate",
"issue AP2 mandate for UCP purchase",
"AP2 spending authority UCP 2026-08-25"
],
"id": "delegate_mandate",
"inputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"name": "Delegate Mandate",
"outputModes": [
"application/json"
],
"representativeQueries": [
"Create a sub-mandate from my existing spending authorization for a smaller amount",
"Delegate part of my mandate to the traveler agent for checkout",
"I have a parent mandate for 600 euros, give the booking agent a 420 euro sub-mandate"
],
"securityRequirements": [
{
"noAuth": []
}
],
"tags": [
"mandate",
"delegation",
"attenuation",
"ap2"
]
}
],
"supportedInterfaces": [
{
"protocolBinding": "jsonrpc",
"protocolVersion": "1.0",
"url": "https://authority.webmesh.ai"
}
],
"url": "https://authority.webmesh.ai",
"version": "1.0.8",
"x-discovery": {
"ans_name": "ans://v1.0.8.authority.webmesh.ai",
"ans_registered": "prod",
"dns_aid_svcb": "authority.webmesh.ai IN SVCB 1 . alpn=a2a,h2",
"tl_badge": "https://transparency.ans.godaddy.com/v1/agents/c2eaaf32-faba-410e-b043-c47212fc99ca",
"trust_index": {
"auth": "sso-key",
"score_field": "scores.trustScore",
"score_url": "https://api.godaddy.com/v1/ans/registered-agents?query=authority.webmesh.ai"
}
},
"x-identity": {
"ans": {
"transparencyLog": "https://transparency.ans.godaddy.com/v1/agents/c2eaaf32-faba-410e-b043-c47212fc99ca",
"trustCard": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json",
"uri": "ans://v1.0.8.authority.webmesh.ai"
},
"wimse": {
"jwksUri": "https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/jwks.json",
"signingAlgs": [
"EdDSA"
],
"spiffeId": "spiffe://webmesh.ai/agents/authority",
"supportedProfiles": [
"urn:ietf:params:wimse:agent-delegation-chain"
]
}
},
"x-security-note": "request_mandate enforces requester-identity verification: callers must include a compact EdDSA JWS (request_jws) signed with their ANS identity key, binding the mandate arguments. The authority fetches the caller's public key from their ANS JWKS endpoint and verifies argument binding, freshness (300 s window), and replay (jti dedup). get_policy is unauthenticated (noAuth). Denial codes: REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED, BAD_SIGNATURE, STALE_REQUEST, REPLAYED_REQUEST, SUBJECT_MISMATCH, ARGS_MISMATCH, IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED, INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS."
}