{"domain":"authority.webmesh.ai","count":8,"changes":[{"captured_at":"2026-11-10T18:13:18.853226","card_hash":"7dfbe3def5ed514739e9277375f4c7cd4dc77f66f633f1f6243efc136faf6f79","previous_card_hash":"123e50f90e2989cafcb1bc5720cc799dd87d0c270045e343ef49e7127adef24c","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"internal fields changed"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-10T11:56:24.309821","card_hash":"123e50f90e2989cafcb1bc5720cc799dd87d0c270045e343ef49e7127adef24c","previous_card_hash":"8f0ce4c4fa884d1e073af479c3d8aa9bbf2c2354188789da017cf2b20cc46918","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[{"id":"delegate_mandate","fields":["description"]},{"id":"get_policy","fields":["description"]},{"id":"request_mandate","fields":["description","tags"]}],"fields_changed":[{"field":"description","before":"The human's spending policy as a machine-verifiable instrument. Approves once and issues narrowly scoped RFC 9421 AP2 mandates with DPoP key binding (jkt). Stubbed Auth0 consent for the demo; mandate is the wire artifact the Supplier verifies and the Auditor checks.","after":"Proof-of-concept spending authority for buyer agents. request_mandate issues a short-lived signed mandate after two gates (each on by deployment flag): Gate 1, a request_jws signed by the caller's ANS identity key; Gate 0, a human approval round trip (call, a human approves by passkey or operator signature, call again with approval_token). mandate_format=ap2 returns an open AP2 v0.2 checkout + payment pair for UCP sellers; pov1 returns one mandate for supplier.webmesh.ai book_flight. Both are capped per trip. delegate_mandate attenuates an AP2 pair; get_policy returns the caps."},{"field":"version","before":"1.0.8","after":"1.0.9"},{"field":"securitySchemes","before":{"ansIdentityCert":{"description":"ANS Identity Certificate issued by the ANS Registration Authority. The agent presents this cert during the TLS handshake; clients verify against the chain advertised in the Trust Card's keys[].x5c. See https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json","type":"mutualTLS"},"httpMessageSignatures":{"description":"RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures over response components, using the Ed25519 key advertised in the Trust Card. Public key directory at https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","scheme":"signature","type":"http"},"noAuth":{"description":"This agent is publicly accessible with no authentication required. All skills are available to any caller.","type":"noAuth"},"requesterSignature":{"alg":"EdDSA","boundArgs":["subject_ans","quote_id","total","currency","merchant_ans","scope_hint","traveler_dpop_jwk"],"denialCodes":["REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED","BAD_SIGNATURE","STALE_REQUEST","REPLAYED_REQUEST","SUBJECT_MISMATCH","ARGS_MISMATCH","IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED","INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS"],"description":"Caller must include request_jws: a compact JWS (alg=EdDSA) signed with the caller's ANS identity Ed25519 key. Payload must bind: subject_ans, quote_id, total, currency, merchant_ans, scope_hint, traveler_dpop_jwk. Freshness: iat within 300 s of server time. Replay protection: jti stored per-request for 2x the freshness window; reuse is denied. JWKS discovery: authority resolves the caller's public key from {caller_host}/.well-known/jwks.json (internal loopback when GOVWARE_JWKS_INTERNAL_{SUBDOMAIN} is set). Denial codes: REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED, BAD_SIGNATURE, STALE_REQUEST, REPLAYED_REQUEST, SUBJECT_MISMATCH, ARGS_MISMATCH, IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED, INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS.","format":"compact-jws","freshnessSecs":300,"in":"toolArgument","jwksDiscovery":"caller-ans-jwks","name":"request_jws","replayProtection":"jti-dedup","type":"requesterJws"}},"after":{"ansIdentityCert":{"description":"ANS Identity Certificate issued by the ANS Registration Authority. The agent presents this cert during the TLS handshake; clients verify against the chain advertised in the Trust Card's keys[].x5c. See https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json","type":"mutualTLS"},"httpMessageSignatures":{"description":"RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures over response components, using the Ed25519 key advertised in the Trust Card. Public key directory at https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","scheme":"signature","type":"http"},"noAuth":{"description":"This agent is publicly accessible with no authentication required. All skills are available to any caller.","type":"noAuth"},"requesterSignature":{"alg":"EdDSA","boundArgs":["subject_ans","quote_id","total","currency","merchant_ans","scope_hint","traveler_dpop_jwk","merchant_id","offer_id","total_minor","issuer_mode"],"denialCodes":["REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED","BAD_SIGNATURE","STALE_REQUEST","REPLAYED_REQUEST","SUBJECT_MISMATCH","ARGS_MISMATCH","IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED"],"description":"request_mandate argument request_jws: a compact JWS, header alg EdDSA (optional kid), signed with the Ed25519 key that https://<host of subject_ans>/.well-known/jwks.json publishes. Payload: {subject_ans, args, iat, jti}. args carries each boundArgs member the call carries, with the value the tool receives (defaults included); pov1 calls bind the first seven, ap2 calls also merchant_id, offer_id, total_minor, and issuer_mode when it is guest. iat within 300 s of server time and not in the future; jti single-use for 600 s. Denial codes: REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED, BAD_SIGNATURE, STALE_REQUEST, REPLAYED_REQUEST, SUBJECT_MISMATCH, ARGS_MISMATCH, IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED.","format":"compact-jws","freshnessSecs":300,"in":"toolArgument","jwksDiscovery":"caller-ans-jwks","name":"request_jws","replayProtection":"jti-dedup","type":"requesterJws"}}},{"field":"capabilities","before":{"extendedAgentCard":false,"extensions":[{"description":"MCP server exposing request_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.","params":{"discoveryUrl":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json","endpoint":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp","protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","transport":"streamable-http"},"required":false,"uri":"https://modelcontextprotocol.io"},{"description":"Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.","params":{"agentFacts":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json","ard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json","httpMessageSignaturesDirectory":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","identityAnchors":["ans-x509","did:web","dns-aid","dnssec","dane-tlsa","dnsid"],"outboundSigning":"web-bot-auth","trustCard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"},"required":false,"uri":"https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"},{"params":{"ansRegistrationRequired":true,"profile":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ucp","version":"2026-08-25"},"uri":"urn:webmesh:ucp:2026-08-25"}],"pushNotifications":false,"streaming":false},"after":{"extendedAgentCard":false,"extensions":[{"description":"MCP server exposing request_mandate, delegate_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.","params":{"discoveryUrl":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json","endpoint":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp","protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","transport":"streamable-http"},"required":false,"uri":"https://modelcontextprotocol.io"},{"description":"Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.","params":{"agentFacts":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json","ard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json","httpMessageSignaturesDirectory":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","identityAnchors":["ans-x509","did:web","dns-aid","dnssec","dane-tlsa","dnsid"],"outboundSigning":"web-bot-auth","trustCard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"},"required":false,"uri":"https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"},{"description":"UCP 2026-08-25 AP2 mandate issuer. The profile publishes the P-256 key that signs mandate roots (ES256, lifetime 300 s). Obtain a mandate pair with the MCP tool request_mandate, mandate_format=ap2: a signed request, a human approval (passkey or operator signature), and a per-currency cap (get_policy).","params":{"ansRegistrationRequired":true,"profile":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ucp","role":"issuer","version":"2026-08-25"},"required":false,"uri":"urn:webmesh:ucp:2026-08-25"}],"pushNotifications":false,"streaming":false}}],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"updated 3 skills · description The human's spending policy as a machine → Proof-of-concept spending authority for  · version 1.0.8 → 1.0.9 · securitySchemes ansIdentityCert, httpMessageSignatures,  → ansIdentityCert, httpMessageSignatures,  · capabilities extendedAgentCard, extensions, pushNotif → extendedAgentCard, extensions, pushNotif"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-09T04:54:23.552713","card_hash":"8f0ce4c4fa884d1e073af479c3d8aa9bbf2c2354188789da017cf2b20cc46918","previous_card_hash":"0c3a49dd18d72c603e449e824ee69e97e9b4c7c5bea9bab374060e0697273dfa","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[{"id":"delegate_mandate","fields":["description"]}],"fields_changed":[],"other_changed":false,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"updated 1 skill"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-07T10:31:48.321512","card_hash":"0c3a49dd18d72c603e449e824ee69e97e9b4c7c5bea9bab374060e0697273dfa","previous_card_hash":"920d3a66fae0b04eb0ab8e8fe05341e45e3c5029136bb2a220ce4b5301ae080d","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[{"field":"version","before":"1.0.6","after":"1.0.8"}],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"version 1.0.6 → 1.0.8"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-02T10:41:21","card_hash":"920d3a66fae0b04eb0ab8e8fe05341e45e3c5029136bb2a220ce4b5301ae080d","previous_card_hash":"fd08216cfc2b6edbf3894eefa8751dc61e750c3e55c5ac4c256458ff3d645d24","diff":{"skills_added":[{"id":"delegate_mandate","name":"Delegate Mandate","description":"Issue a delegated AP2 spending mandate attenuated from a parent mandate. The delegated amount must be ≤ the parent mandate's granted amount. Enforces per-hop attenuation at mint time so a chain of valid signatures cannot represent authority that was never granted. Returns checkout_mandate and payment_mandate as open AP2 chains, or reason_code SCOPE_EXCEEDED_AT_HOP_2 / REDELEGATION_EXCEEDS_GRANT on refusal.","tags":["mandate","delegation","attenuation","ap2"],"inputModes":["application/json"],"outputModes":["application/json"]}],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[{"field":"version","before":"1.0.5","after":"1.0.6"}],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"added 1 skill · version 1.0.5 → 1.0.6"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-01T23:03:24","card_hash":"fd08216cfc2b6edbf3894eefa8751dc61e750c3e55c5ac4c256458ff3d645d24","previous_card_hash":"3a7ed3a93d9db4a4dcbb95363627163e44d60e99e7fd847b654542e24d5dd165","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[{"field":"version","before":"1.0.4","after":"1.0.5"}],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"version 1.0.4 → 1.0.5"}},{"captured_at":"2026-10-01T15:50:33","card_hash":"3a7ed3a93d9db4a4dcbb95363627163e44d60e99e7fd847b654542e24d5dd165","previous_card_hash":"7576b2c21e24bbf0e8d944aed347c6dde2abd6511484eacf718d698ee9d62d2c","diff":{"skills_added":[],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[{"field":"capabilities","before":{"extendedAgentCard":false,"extensions":[{"description":"MCP server exposing request_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.","params":{"discoveryUrl":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json","endpoint":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp","protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","transport":"streamable-http"},"required":false,"uri":"https://modelcontextprotocol.io"},{"description":"Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.","params":{"agentFacts":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json","ard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json","httpMessageSignaturesDirectory":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","identityAnchors":["ans-x509","did:web","dns-aid","dnssec","dane-tlsa","dnsid"],"outboundSigning":"web-bot-auth","trustCard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"},"required":false,"uri":"https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"}],"pushNotifications":false,"streaming":false},"after":{"extendedAgentCard":false,"extensions":[{"description":"MCP server exposing request_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.","params":{"discoveryUrl":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json","endpoint":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp","protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","transport":"streamable-http"},"required":false,"uri":"https://modelcontextprotocol.io"},{"description":"Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.","params":{"agentFacts":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json","ard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json","httpMessageSignaturesDirectory":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","identityAnchors":["ans-x509","did:web","dns-aid","dnssec","dane-tlsa","dnsid"],"outboundSigning":"web-bot-auth","trustCard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"},"required":false,"uri":"https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"},{"params":{"ansRegistrationRequired":true,"profile":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ucp","version":"2026-08-25"},"uri":"urn:webmesh:ucp:2026-08-25"}],"pushNotifications":false,"streaming":false}}],"other_changed":false,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"capabilities extendedAgentCard, extensions, pushNotif → extendedAgentCard, extensions, pushNotif"}},{"captured_at":"2026-09-24T17:33:46","card_hash":"7576b2c21e24bbf0e8d944aed347c6dde2abd6511484eacf718d698ee9d62d2c","previous_card_hash":null,"diff":{"skills_added":[{"id":"get_policy","name":"Get Policy","description":"Return the current spending policy (max_per_trip, currency, allowed_merchants, categories).","tags":["mandate","policy"],"inputModes":["application/json"],"outputModes":["application/json"]},{"id":"request_mandate","name":"Issue Mandate","description":"Issue a signed AP2 mandate with DPoP key binding (jkt). Requires a compact EdDSA JWS (request_jws) signed by the caller's ANS identity key, binding subject_ans, quote_id, total, currency, merchant_ans, scope_hint, and traveler_dpop_jwk. Freshness window: 300 s. Replay protection: jti must be unique. JWKS fetched from the caller's ANS JWKS endpoint.","tags":["mandate","authorization","dpop","requester-signature"],"inputModes":["application/json"],"outputModes":["application/json"]}],"skills_removed":[],"skills_changed":[],"fields_changed":[{"field":"name","before":null,"after":"Spending Authority"},{"field":"description","before":null,"after":"The human's spending policy as a machine-verifiable instrument. Approves once and issues narrowly scoped RFC 9421 AP2 mandates with DPoP key binding (jkt). Stubbed Auth0 consent for the demo; mandate is the wire artifact the Supplier verifies and the Auditor checks."},{"field":"version","before":null,"after":"1.0.4"},{"field":"protocolVersion","before":null,"after":"1.0"},{"field":"url","before":null,"after":"https://authority.webmesh.ai"},{"field":"documentationUrl","before":null,"after":"https://agent.webmesh.ai"},{"field":"supportedInterfaces","before":null,"after":[{"protocolBinding":"jsonrpc","protocolVersion":"1.0","url":"https://authority.webmesh.ai"}]},{"field":"securitySchemes","before":null,"after":{"ansIdentityCert":{"description":"ANS Identity Certificate issued by the ANS Registration Authority. The agent presents this cert during the TLS handshake; clients verify against the chain advertised in the Trust Card's keys[].x5c. See https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json","type":"mutualTLS"},"httpMessageSignatures":{"description":"RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures over response components, using the Ed25519 key advertised in the Trust Card. Public key directory at https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","scheme":"signature","type":"http"},"noAuth":{"description":"This agent is publicly accessible with no authentication required. All skills are available to any caller.","type":"noAuth"},"requesterSignature":{"alg":"EdDSA","boundArgs":["subject_ans","quote_id","total","currency","merchant_ans","scope_hint","traveler_dpop_jwk"],"denialCodes":["REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED","BAD_SIGNATURE","STALE_REQUEST","REPLAYED_REQUEST","SUBJECT_MISMATCH","ARGS_MISMATCH","IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED","INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS"],"description":"Caller must include request_jws: a compact JWS (alg=EdDSA) signed with the caller's ANS identity Ed25519 key. Payload must bind: subject_ans, quote_id, total, currency, merchant_ans, scope_hint, traveler_dpop_jwk. Freshness: iat within 300 s of server time. Replay protection: jti stored per-request for 2x the freshness window; reuse is denied. JWKS discovery: authority resolves the caller's public key from {caller_host}/.well-known/jwks.json (internal loopback when GOVWARE_JWKS_INTERNAL_{SUBDOMAIN} is set). Denial codes: REQUEST_NOT_SIGNED, BAD_SIGNATURE, STALE_REQUEST, REPLAYED_REQUEST, SUBJECT_MISMATCH, ARGS_MISMATCH, IDENTITY_UNVERIFIED, INSUFFICIENT_FUNDS.","format":"compact-jws","freshnessSecs":300,"in":"toolArgument","jwksDiscovery":"caller-ans-jwks","name":"request_jws","replayProtection":"jti-dedup","type":"requesterJws"}}},{"field":"securityRequirements","before":null,"after":[{"noAuth":[]}]},{"field":"capabilities","before":null,"after":{"extendedAgentCard":false,"extensions":[{"description":"MCP server exposing request_mandate and get_policy over streamable-HTTP.","params":{"discoveryUrl":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/mcp.json","endpoint":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/mcp","protocolVersion":"2025-03-26","transport":"streamable-http"},"required":false,"uri":"https://modelcontextprotocol.io"},{"description":"Identity and interoperability stack: ANS Trust Card (x5c chain + stapled SCITT receipt), DNS-AID SVCB with DNSSEC and DANE TLSA, DNSid organizational accountability, ARD / AI-Catalog discovery, and Web Bot Auth (RFC 9421 HTTP Message Signatures) outbound request signing.","params":{"agentFacts":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/agentfacts.json","ard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ard.json","httpMessageSignaturesDirectory":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/http-message-signatures-directory","identityAnchors":["ans-x509","did:web","dns-aid","dnssec","dane-tlsa","dnsid"],"outboundSigning":"web-bot-auth","trustCard":"https://authority.webmesh.ai/.well-known/ans/trust-card.json"},"required":false,"uri":"https://webmesh.ai/ext/ans-trust-stack/v1"}],"pushNotifications":false,"streaming":false}},{"field":"provider","before":null,"after":{"did":"did:web:authority.webmesh.ai","organization":"Webmesh","url":"https://webmesh.ai"}}],"other_changed":true,"is_empty":false,"human_summary":"added 2 skills · name ∅ → Spending Authority · description ∅ → The human's spending policy as a machine · version ∅ → 1.0.4 · protocolVersion ∅ → 1.0 · url ∅ → https://authority.webmesh.ai · documentationUrl ∅ → https://agent.webmesh.ai · supportedInterfaces ∅ → https://authority.webmesh.ai (jsonrpc) · securitySchemes ∅ → ansIdentityCert, httpMessageSignatures,  · securityRequirements ∅ → noAuth · capabilities ∅ → extendedAgentCard, extensions, pushNotif · provider ∅ → Webmesh"}}]}